| Internet-Draft | DRIP DKI | November 2024 |
| Moskowitz & Card | Expires 19 May 2025 | [Page] |
The DRIP Entity Tag (DET) public Key Infrastructure (DKI) is a specific variant of classic Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) where the organization is around the DET, in place of X.520 Distinguished Names. Further, the DKI uses DRIP Endorsements in place of X.509 certificates for establishing trust within the DKI.¶
There are two X.509 profiles for shadow PKI behind the DKI, with many of their X.509 fields mirroring content in the DRIP Endorsements. This PKI can at times be used where X.509 is expected and non-constrained communication links are available that can handle their larger size.¶
C509 (CBOR) encoding of all X.509 certificates are also provided as an alternative for where there are gains in reduced object size.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2025.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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A DRIP Entity Tag (DET, [RFC9374]) public Key Infrastructure (DKI) is designed as a strict hierarchy, governed by the administrator of the DET prefix [IPv6-SPECIAL] and having the authority to authorize RAAs. RAAs in turn authorize HDAs within their domain. This authorization is managed via a set of DETs whose sole use is to define the DKI. The RAA Authorization DETs MUST reside in HID = RAA#|0 (Apex Authorization DET in HID = 0|0).¶
There are three main classifications/types of DETs:¶
All DETs exist in DET-Endorsements (Appendix B of [drip-registries]). These DET-Endorsements provide the proof of registration and thus trust. These DETs, through chained Endorsements define the DKI as follows:¶
+----------+
| Auth |
+-o------o-+
| |
| +-o-----+
Apex | +--o----+|
| | Issue |+
| +---o---+
| |
| +-o-----+
| +--o----+|
| |CRL,Srv|+
| +-------+
|
******************|************************************
+-o--------+
+-o--------+|
| Auth |+
+--o-----o-+
| |
| +-o-----+
RAAs | +--o----+|
| | Issue |+
| +---o---+
| |
| +-o--------+
| +--o-------+|
| | CRL,Srv |+
| |Oper,Pilot|+
| +----------+
|
******************|************************************
+-o--------+
+-o--------+|
| Auth |+
+----o-----+
|
+-o-----+
HDAs +--o----+|
| Issue |+
+---o---+
|
+-o-------+
+--o------+|
| CRL,Srv ||
| UAS |+
+---------+
*******************************************************
The Authorization DETs exist in a set of DET-Authorization-Endorsements. The lifetime of these endorsements SHOULD be no less than 1 year, recommended 5 years, and should not exceed 10 years. Endorsements SHOULD be reissued prior to expiry (may be for a new DET). DETs used to define this authorization are replaced per undetermined policy (note these DETs do very little signing, see Section 7.1).¶
This separation of DET type roles reduce the risk of private key loss for the critical Authentication DETs by making them infrequently used and only used in offline operations. It does make the chain of trust for a HDA customers' Operational DETs to be 4 Endorsements.¶
The hierarchical design of the DKI is the most efficient possible with the least data transmission overhead. But it requires the participation of an Entity, in the role of the Apex, trusted by all the RAAs. The logical Entity for this role is the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO), but the processes for ICAO to take on this role are complex. Work is ongoing with the ICAO, but timing is indeterminate and immediately implementable alternatives are needed.¶
The DKI can work by the RAAs establishing mutual trust within a geographic region. It is envisioned that the initial RAA assignments will follow Section 6.2.1 of [drip-registries], Table 1. Without an Apex, each RAA self-endorses its Authentication DET, acting as its own apex. However, RAAs issued DETs (via their HDAs) will not exist in the air by themselves (except perhaps for some small island nations), thus a geographic regional consortium of RAAs will need to deploy some mechanism for mutual trust for their End Entities to fly together.¶
There are three reasonable approaches for RAAs to manage their mutual trust and it is likely that all will occur:¶
It is recommended that the RAA Trust List be used during initial DKI testing. The cross-endorsing options will need their own testing to work out how best to deploy them.¶
A consortium of RAAs MAY choose to maintain a list of RAAs they trust. It is recommended that this list consist of the RAA's Authentication DET and HI. Each RAA in the consortium SHOULD maintain its own list, signed with its Authentication DET.¶
This Trust List MAY contain each RAA's Authentication DET self-endorsement validity dates. If a trusted RAA has more than one self-endorsement (most likely to support key rollover), including these dates makes it easier to have an RAA duplicated in the list.¶
How the RAAs communicate between themselves to maintain these lists is out of scope here. Each RAA SHOULD include validity dates in its Trust List. Frequency of Trust List updates is also out of scope here.¶
Trust Lists is the simplest method to implement, but may not be the simplest to maintain over time.¶
There is a natural Trust List of ALL RAAs, based on what is allocated in the DRIP DNS tree.¶
A consortium of RAAs MAY choose to cross-endorse each's Authentication DET. This is done by one RAA endorsing for its community, an other's Authentication DET. This establishes one-way trust; thus, in practice, each RAA needs to cross-endorse each RAA's Authentication DET within the consortium.¶
RAA Cross-endorsements definitely has a scaling (n^2) problem. It works for a starting point or for a very small group of RAAs.¶
How these RAA Cross-endorsements are discovered has not been defined at this point. One potential is via a to-be-defined DNS HHIT RR within the endorsing RAA's zone. This information would need to be cached by any potential offline entity.¶
A consortium of RAAs MAY select one RAA to function as a "Bridge" between all members of the consortium. In this approach, the "Bridge RAA" does not authorize any sub-HDAs. Its sole purpose is the cross-endorse to member RAAs. The Bridge and each RAA cross endorse as in Section 1.1.2.¶
Bridge RAA Cross-endorsementing reduces the scaling challenge to only the number of RAAs in the consortium. Plus there is little need to communicate any changes in the cross-endorsementing to the various parties within the consortium. Thus this option scales the best out of the three alternatives to DKI Apex hierarchy.¶
How these RAA Cross-endorsements are discovered has not been defined at this point. The Bridge RAA will have to be known to all parties within the consortium. One potential, as above, is via a to-be-defined DNS HHIT RR (Appendix A of [drip-registries]) within the endorsing RAA's zone. This information would need to be cached by any potential offline entity.¶
A price in object size is paid in the ASN.1 encoding of X.509 certificates. This is often a barrier for use over constrained links and even storage demands on constrained processing platforms. The [C509-Certificates] provides an alternative encoding in two different manners:¶
The invertible CBOR encoding is recommended for use here. This can be readily implemented through libraries that do the translation, as needed, between X.509 and c509.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terms defined in Section 2.2 of Drip Requirements and Terminology [RFC9153] and in Section 2 of Drip Architecture [RFC9434]. The following new terms are used in the document:¶
The Apex Authorization DET is used to endorse RAA Authorization DETs and its own Apex Issuing DETs; it has no other use. This is the case for all Authorization DETs. Apex Issuing DETs are used to endorse DETs, with HID= 0|0, used by Apex services.¶
The DET Apex may be only theoretical if no Entity steps forward to provide this role.¶
Each RAA use its Authorization DET (HID = RAA#|0) to endorse its RAA Issuing DET(s) (also HID = RAA#|0) and for signing its HDA Authorization DETs (HID = RAA#|HDA#).¶
An RAA may have multiple Issuing DETs (HID = RAA#|0), each for a different use (e.g. CRL signing, RAA server signing). It is expected that, over time, an RAA will rollover its Issuing DETs, thus at times there will be more than ONE Issuing DET per role in use.¶
These Issuing DETs, like those at the Apex level, constitute an implicit HDA. There is no Authorization DET for this implicit HDA, but other than only signing for entities like servers needed by the RAA, it should be considered as an HDA in terms of policies.¶
The initial RAA range assignments are defined in Section 6.2.1 of [drip-registries], Table 1. It is anticipated that DRIP usage will expand to use into General/Civil Aviation. Thus at some point a block of RAAs will be set aside much like for the CTA-2063A [CTA2063A] range.¶
Each HDA use its Authorization DET to endorse its HDA Issuing DETs (e.g. RAA=267, HDA=567).¶
An HDA Issuing DET is used to endorse Operational DETs; those used by the HDA for its services (e.g. USS) and for Devices (e.g. UA, GCS, ground infrastructure) partaking in the HDA's services.¶
If the Operational DET is a Manufacturer DET, the "valid not after" date (vna) MUST be 99991231235959Z.¶
The Authentication DETs private keys MUST NEVER be on a system with any network connectivity. Also efforts MUST be taken to limit any external digital media connections to these offline systems. Compromise of an Authentication DET compromises its and all lower hierarchy levels. Such a compromise could result in a major re-signing effort with a new Authentication DET. Also, during the time of compromise, fraudulent additions to the DKI could have occurred.¶
This means that the process whereby the Authentication DET is used to sign the Endorsement/X.509 certificate of its level's Issuing DET(s) and lower level Authentication DETs MUST be conducted in an offline manner.¶
This offline process need not be onerous. For example, QR codes could be used to pass CSR objects to the offline Authentication DET system, and this system could produce QR codes containing the Endorsements and X.509 certificates it signed.¶
A video conference between the parties could have one side show its QR code and the other copy and print it to move between the video conferencing system and the offline system. This is a simplification of a larger signing operation, but shows how such a signing need not require travel and expensive hand-off methodologies.¶
It should be noted that the endorsement of Issuing DETs follow the same restriction, as it is done with the Authentication DET. It MUST be conducted in an offline manner.¶
The primary view of the DKI is within DNS. This is in the 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa zone (Apex level of the DRIP IPv6 DET format).¶
In the DET DNS structure, only the Apex and RAA levels MUST be DNSSEC signed. The HDA level may be too dynamic for DNSSEC signing (e.g. hundreds of new EE Operational DETs per hour); trust in the EE Operational DETs within the HDA level comes through inclusion of the HDA Endorsement of EE object. A slow-churn HDA MAY use DNSSEC. The RAA and HDA levels MUST contain their Endorsement by higher object; this provides the needed trust in the Endorsement of EE objects. The Apex level Endorsement is self-signed, thus trust in it is only possible via DNSSEC.¶
Endorsements are expected to be stored in DNS HHIT RR (Appendix A of [drip-registries]) will soon provide an alternative and specifically designed RR for this purpose. Other RR within these levels will vary. There also may be HIP, TLSA, and/or URI RR.¶
Each level continues on down the 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa zone for its Authorization DET and Issuing DET(s). RR with FQDNs for services offered may also be present in various forms (e.g. a URI for the commercial FQDN for the DKI Entity). TLSA RR of DET SPKI may be directly included here. Same with HIP RR. The Authorization Endorsement SHOULD be present, as SHOULD be Issuing Endorsements.¶
For Operational DETs, there is no direct concept of DET revocation. Operational DETs are either discoverable via DNS or not valid despite being in a non-expired Endorsement signed an Issuing DET. Thus if an Issuing Entity needs to "revoke" an Operational DET it removes all entries for it from DNS, so a short TTL on those records is recommended.¶
Authorization and Issuing DETs are not so easily "revoked"; something akin to an X.509 CRL mechanism is needed. This could best be dealt with by Endorsements managed in the new DET RR that includes revocation status. Thus Appendix A of [drip-registries] defines the specific RR for Endorsements that will be used here. Minimally, at least the revocation status and revocation date(s) need to be in this RR. Until this RR is available, there is no mechanism, other than removal for Authorization and Issuing DET revocations.¶
The Offline cache of HDA Issuing Endorsements, used to verify various EE signed objects without needing DNS access, SHOULD consist of the HDA Authentication DET Endorsements of the HDA Issuing DETs. Thus the receiver has a trusted source of the HDA Issuing DET Public Key (HI) in a DRIP standard object (136 bytes). If the DKI DNS tree includes GEO location data and coverage, a receiver could query some service for a trusted cache within some radius of its location. Such as, please tell me of all HDAs within 100KM of...¶
This cache MAY contain the full chain up to the Apex. This could be helpful in limited connectivity environments when encountering an HDA Issuing DET under a unknown Authenticated HDA or RAA. The needed trust chain could be shorter.¶
There are situations where a list of specific HDAs for an entity to trust for some application is needed. This can best be met by maintaining a cache as above but only of the trusted HDA Issuing Endorsements. How a list of this limited trust is maintain and distributed is out of scope of this document and is left to those needing this specific feature.¶
The following defines the components of a DKI's shadow PKI built from X.509 certificates with content that mirrors that in the DKI Endorsements. There are two profiles provided; both may be used, or the community may select one for deployment. In both cases, the PKI tree mirrors that of the DKI levels (Section 3.1).¶
At this point in defining the shadow PKIs, alternatives to a strict hierarchy is still an open work item. This work will follow the pattern set in Section 1.1.¶
The Lite-PKI is designed to fully mirror the DKI in the smallest reasonable X.509 certificates (e.g. 240 bytes for DER), but still adhere to [RFC5280] MUST field usage.¶
The following is the profile for the DRIP X.509 Lite certificates¶
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN =
Validity
Not Before:
Not After :
Subject: {CN = or Empty}
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
X509v3 extensions: {Operation Certs ONLY}
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
The following detail the Manditory to include content in all DRIP Lite certificates.¶
The Serial Number is a MUST field, but it has no usage in this Lite-PKI. It is 1-byte in size and thus duplicates are guaranteed. To drop this field could make many X.509 parsing libraries fail.¶
However, CA certificate's Serial Number MAY be the common 20 bytes. This is to avoid possible issues with general softward expecting this size Serial Numbers for CAs.¶
The Subject field is only used in Authentication and Issuing Certificates. For Entity Certificates, the Subject is Empty and the DET will be in Subject Alternative Name (SAN). In the SAN, the DET can be properly encoded as an IPv6 address.¶
The Subject field in Authentication and Issuing Certificates uses the following format:¶
DRIP-{APEX|RAA|HDA}-{A|I}[-RAA#][-HDA#]
Examples:
DRIP-RAA-A-16376
DRIP-HDA-I-16376-16376
The CA Subject Name serves a duo purpose: foremostly, to place the CA within the DKI tree, but secondly for outside of DRIP usage to tag that this CA's function is to serve DRIP Entities.¶
Subject Alternative Name is only used in Operational (End Entity) certificates. It is used to provide the DET as an IP address with an Empty Subject (SAN MUST be flagged as Critical).¶
The Subject Alternative Name is also used in Manufacturer DET certificates. These may contain the hardwareModuleName as described in [IEEE 802.1AR] that references [RFC4108].¶
Per [RFC5280] and [IEEE 802.1AR], Manufacturer DET certificates with hardwareModuleName MUST have the notAfter date as 99991231235959Z.¶
The Issuer MUST be the higher level's DET.¶
The Issuer for the Apex Authentication certificate MUST be the Subject (indicating self-signed).¶
The Issuer content of its DET assists in finding this specific Issuer in the DRIP ip6.arpa. DNS tree and any additional information.¶
The test DKI and Lite PKI, (Appendix A/Appendix B), were created using the python scripts at [drip_scripts]. First csr-gen.py is used to create an X.509 CSR (and optionally the EdDSA keypair). This CSR is minimal in content. For example, a UA might only have knowledge of its Manufacturer Serial Number and can generate its keypair. Per [drip-registration-cwt], this CSR may be sent to the CA with additional information provided by the Operator, for example desired validityDates. The raa-endorse.py and hda-endorse.py scripts are provided to produce the DRIP Endorsements and X.509 certificates.¶
At this time, with no Apex level, each RAA Authorization CA is self-signed. These are created using the RAA's CSR and its own keypair as input to the raa-endorse.py script. Normally, the raa-endorse.py script is used to create the HDA's Authorization and Issuing CAs and the hda-endorse.py script for the End Entity certificates.¶
The following detail the Optional content for DRIP Lite CA certificates. Inclusion of these objects are based on the policies of the CA using them and CAs higher in the trust chain.¶
This is the one exception to Section 4.1.2.3. A CA certificate MAY have a SAN URI, containing a pointer where additional information on the CA and certificates under its control. For example, an authorized authority may access EE PII like an Oberator phone number through this URI link.¶
The CA MAY have policy OIDs defining rules for EEs within its domain. The OIDs used here will tend to be within ICAO's arc of 1.3.9.16.¶
Author's Note: The PKIX-like Certificate model has been abandoned for now due to lack of interest in these larger ~400 bytes for DER) size. For information on these certificates, please review the first draft of this document.¶
The ICAO has defined an International Aviation Common PKI (IAC) PKI in their ICAO Doc 10169 Aviation Common Certificate Policy (ACCP). A test version of this PKI is rolling out for testing the Aviation System Wide Information Management (SWIM) environment.¶
Currently, this PKI is using ECDSA P-256 in its certificates. This is equivalent to DET SuiteID of "3". The subjectNames in use can readily by mapped to RAAs (Section 6.2.1 of [drip-registries], Table 1) and HDAs. Thus it is a potential straight-forward technical work item to add DET support into the PKI.¶
The DETs can readily be stored in subjectAltName or more interestingly in subjectKeyIdentifier (and thus authorityKeyIdentifier).¶
There are a number of advantages in the IATF and SWIM to have DETs and the matching DNS available. For example, the "cost" of adding DETs to these certificates could result in moving much of their content into DNS SRV RR and potentially reduce their size by 1/3rd. DETs as the authorityKeyIdentifier would enable DNS for Trust Chain discovery.¶
Another approach is direct inclusion in this PKI of the DET "Lite" EE certificates for constrained A2A communications.¶
Discussions are ongoing with those involved with the IATF PKI and this could open up DET usage into General/Civil Aviation.¶
Risks in the DKI are similar to those in any X.509 PKI. The methodologies to mitigate risk in PKI management should be considered and implemented as appropriate.¶
The DKI presents a tree-breath problem that is rarely seen in PKIs and needs practical solutions to minimize cost of operations and not introduce risks needlessly. Consider that there can be 16,384 RAAs. Assume only 10,000 RAAs, each of which Authentication DET Endorsement has a 10 year validity period. This means that, on average, 1,000 RAAs per year need to rekey their Authentication DET Endorsement, or on average, 3 per day. Current witnessed key signing processes will not scale to this volume. Some virtual method (like in Section 3.2) is needed.¶
There is always a risk of key compromise that could be a major setback to the operation of a PKI and likewise the DRIP DKI. To mitigate this risk, the Authentication DETs MUST only be used in offline signing operations. They MUST NEVER be used on connected systems. The information needed to create the Endorsements and X.509 certificates are brought to them on media that cannot transfer code, for example in a QR code. The objects that are created are then transferred away from the offline system to be used where needed.¶
It should be noted that this offline process MUST be followed down the DKI/PKI tree. That is, the Apex has offline operations that include signing the RAA Authentication DET that will be used in the RAA's set up.¶
The following are test DETs and Endorsements for the test DKI. This testing environment is open to all. There are 4 RAAs available for others to build out. HDAs under the 4 preset RAAs, or under any of the 4, built out by others, are available. Finally the test HDA is available for setting up a handful of entities. Any tester wanting more than a few DETs for entities should plan on doing that under their own HDA.¶
The following are the test values and objects. They were generated using the csr-gen.py, raa-endorse.py, and hda-endorse.py scripts available at [drip_scripts].¶
Note, that as there is no APEX level at this time, the RAA Endorsement is self-signed.¶
raa16376
Authorizing DET (HID=16376|0)
# SN is there just because script needs it.
python csr-gen.py --keyname=raa16376 --serialnumber=0 --raa=16376/
--hda=0
python raa-endorse.py --commandfile=raa16376
HI: 32528c1c115d004d1f008d07ac507a2d83bbab746040522ea6cdc786fa
bc8057
DET: 2001003ffe00000506ab58754f68e6b3
DET: 2001:003f:fe00:0005:06ab:5875:4f68:e6b3
vnb="09/01/2024"
vna="08/31/2026"
Endorsement(136 bytes): 66d3e6c06a94fc402001003ffe00000506ab58
754f68e6b332528c1c115d004d1f008d07ac507a2d83bbab746040522ea6cd
c786fabc80572001003ffe00000506ab58754f68e6b3f5d13f1074171192f8
f5e4b25f200cf3cc5ef6a8cc10d0c93e91ab882a888ccd7fb970c56c20e97e
22f60b7d1179d214a7c9fa8c70081c3482667add575d0a08
hda16376-16376
Authorizing DET (HID=16376|16376)
# SN is there just because script needs it.
python csr-gen.py --keyname=hda16376-16376A --serialnumber=0
python raa-endorse.py --commandfile=hda16376-16376A
HI: 4293a3ec0639737e65db3979fb3dab83a97510cfb52e83d5ecaea40adf
45585d
DET: 2001003ffe3ff805ce4d71fcd8a27a9d
DET: 2001:003f:fe3f:f805:ce4d:71fc:d8a2:7a9d
DETofRAA=2001003ffe00000506ab58754f68e6b3
vnb="09/15/2024"
vna="07/01/2026"
Endorsement(136 bytes): 66e65bc06a4490c02001003ffe3ff805ce4d71
fcd8a27a9d4293a3ec0639737e65db3979fb3dab83a97510cfb52e83d5ecae
a40adf45585d2001003ffe00000506ab58754f68e6b3a96328ac620f9dd7d1
2a7d9f6e94424b69e59584116d73763145be04ef743bbada14d11f158ee32e
ff33296fb8cc6cad8d3cdfee866e27a720b685c731edde07
Issuing DET (HID=16376|16376)
# SN is there just because script needs it.
python csr-gen.py --keyname=hda16376-16376I --serialnumber=0
python raa-endorse.py --commandfile=hda16376-16376I
HI: 95f4a64fc559a17092c738f7be02a9ed7aef51b152e4eb2c8b0a0dc175
80b7e0
DET: 2001003ffe3ff8059f5514beac58f8db
DET: 2001:003f:fe3f:f805:9f55:14be:ac58:f8db
DETofHDA=0x2001003ffe3ff805ce4d71fcd8a27a9d
vnb="09/15/2024"
vna="07/01/2026"
Endorsement(136 bytes): 66e65bc06a4490c02001003ffe3ff8059f5514
beac58f8db95f4a64fc559a17092c738f7be02a9ed7aef51b152e4eb2c8b0a
0dc17580b7e02001003ffe3ff805ce4d71fcd8a27a9dea50c3de79536ea208
fe792a3e7241d0d8c67fc8a94ec925709a3b19e8b7eaa4c1714762f4c83ea2
0e10c4dc5ea049b22a51cfbbae39be5874c31fd5bf9e4f00
UA DET in 16376.16376
python csr-gen.py --keyname=ua1-16376-16376/
--serialnumber=x1224AABBCCDDEE56789
python hda-endorse.py --commandfile=ua1-16376-16376
DET: 2001003ffe3ff80578cc488c41b52b28
DET: 2001:003f:fe3f:f805:78cc:488c:41b5:2b28
SN: x1224AABBCCDDEE56789
DETofHDA=0x2001003ffe3ff8059f5514beac58f8db
vnb="09/19/2024"
vna="09/20/2025"
Endorsement(136 bytes): 66eba1c068ce26c02001003ffe3ff80578cc48
8c41b52b2888f5e2d5c7161b5b15a590b4a56c4759fe46cb1bbad11f070eb3
ec7bdd28a9692001003ffe3ff8059f5514beac58f8db861d2e2a41193aac09
8d96c6e23611733cfbbace751e66f3c1e525e0864fa249e2dc3e48e3477256
770d02dfb0d83ec29ae7887851c2031c907a90f966b05d0d
The DNS tree(s) for the above test data is still in limbo and will be added in a later version of this draft with the proposed DET RR from [drip-registries].¶
The following the test DRIP X.509 certificates that mirror the test Endorsements.¶
raa16376.pem (der is 334 bytes)
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBSjCB/aADAgECAhR3h9ip63LkGZCv25TKeVSCy5PSxTAFBgMrZXAwKzEpMCcG
A1UEAwwgMjAwMTAwM2ZmZTAwMDAwNTA2YWI1ODc1NGY2OGU2YjMwHhcNMjQwOTAx
MDAwMTAwWhcNMjYwODMxMjM1OTAwWjAbMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBEUklQLVJBQS1BLTE2
Mzc2MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAMlKMHBFdAE0fAI0HrFB6LYO7q3RgQFIups3Hhvq8gFej
QzBBMB4GA1UdEQEB/wQUMBKHECABAD/+AAAFBqtYdU9o5rMwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUw
AwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwBQYDK2VwA0EA7+m7dHX/Mv9yLszLuWfBa2kO
mQCEhxyu4yPKaRPEdzzTGsbq8ECF+CGDBiWwt2jiOIK52x6TGtvUbmBpmfbhDw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate: 509 bytes
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
77:87:d8:a9:eb:72:e4:19:90:af:db:94:ca:79:54:82:cb:93:d2:c5
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe00000506ab58754f68e6b3
Validity
Not Before: Sep 1 00:01:00 2024 GMT
Not After : Aug 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT
Subject: CN = DRIP-RAA-A-16376
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
32:52:8c:1c:11:5d:00:4d:1f:00:8d:07:ac:50:7a:
2d:83:bb:ab:74:60:40:52:2e:a6:cd:c7:86:fa:bc:
80:57
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:5:6AB:5875:4F68:E6B3
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
ef:e9:bb:74:75:ff:32:ff:72:2e:cc:cb:b9:67:c1:6b:69:0e:
99:00:84:87:1c:ae:e3:23:ca:69:13:c4:77:3c:d3:1a:c6:ea:
f0:40:85:f8:21:83:06:25:b0:b7:68:e2:38:82:b9:db:1e:93:
1a:db:d4:6e:60:69:99:f6:e1:0f
Authentication hda16376-16376.pem (der is 341 bytes)
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBUTCCAQOgAwIBAgIUWffmfHh1wD4kx1sh/voUrCHqYEQwBQYDK2VwMCsxKTAn
BgNVBAMMIDIwMDEwMDNmZmUwMDAwMDUwNmFiNTg3NTRmNjhlNmIzMB4XDTI0MDkx
NTAwMDEwMFoXDTI2MDcwMTIzNTkwMFowITEfMB0GA1UEAwwWRFJJUC1IREEtQS0x
NjM3Ni0xNjM3NjAqMAUGAytlcAMhAEKTo+wGOXN+Zds5efs9q4OpdRDPtS6D1eyu
pArfRVhdo0MwQTAeBgNVHREBAf8EFDAShxAgAQA//j/4Bc5NcfzYonqdMA8GA1Ud
EwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgIEMAUGAytlcANBACHQ+i1C56CwyE6d
rjq7Ogrez4vfylAXgB6xSTXl7Uh85TI9B+jUl3BJPlvFJS5KXXw4mc1Fa3L7hIGd
zSQWPQc=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate: 518 bytes
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
59:f7:e6:7c:78:75:c0:3e:24:c7:5b:21:fe:fa:14:ac:21:ea:60:44
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe00000506ab58754f68e6b3
Validity
Not Before: Sep 15 00:01:00 2024 GMT
Not After : Jul 1 23:59:00 2026 GMT
Subject: CN = DRIP-HDA-A-16376-16376
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
42:93:a3:ec:06:39:73:7e:65:db:39:79:fb:3d:ab:
83:a9:75:10:cf:b5:2e:83:d5:ec:ae:a4:0a:df:45:
58:5d
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE3F:F805:CE4D:71FC:D8A2:7A9D
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
21:d0:fa:2d:42:e7:a0:b0:c8:4e:9d:ae:3a:bb:3a:0a:de:cf:
8b:df:ca:50:17:80:1e:b1:49:35:e5:ed:48:7c:e5:32:3d:07:
e8:d4:97:70:49:3e:5b:c5:25:2e:4a:5d:7c:38:99:cd:45:6b:
72:fb:84:81:9d:cd:24:16:3d:07
Issuing hda16376-16376.pem (der is 341 bytes)
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBUTCCAQOgAwIBAgIURlST/Y7ug5+XOsyX0nxxMubKnmkwBQYDK2VwMCsxKTAn
BgNVBAMMIDIwMDEwMDNmZmUzZmY4MDVjZTRkNzFmY2Q4YTI3YTlkMB4XDTI0MDkx
NTAwMDEwMFoXDTI2MDcwMTIzNTkwMFowITEfMB0GA1UEAwwWRFJJUC1IREEtSS0x
NjM3Ni0xNjM3NjAqMAUGAytlcAMhAJX0pk/FWaFwksc4974Cqe1671GxUuTrLIsK
DcF1gLfgo0MwQTAeBgNVHREBAf8EFDAShxAgAQA//j/4BZ9VFL6sWPjbMA8GA1Ud
EwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgIEMAUGAytlcANBANXZXfdkuaUGbHzS
To8zHiNLL/EVBJYfX65JafReppAEDdcu22nHykZpLJS+gVv4BHY8fI+MwsFqkXn5
iWr3PQE=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate: 518 bytes
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
46:54:93:fd:8e:ee:83:9f:97:3a:cc:97:d2:7c:71:32:e6:ca:9e:69
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe3ff805ce4d71fcd8a27a9d
Validity
Not Before: Sep 15 00:01:00 2024 GMT
Not After : Jul 1 23:59:00 2026 GMT
Subject: CN = DRIP-HDA-I-16376-16376
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
95:f4:a6:4f:c5:59:a1:70:92:c7:38:f7:be:02:a9:
ed:7a:ef:51:b1:52:e4:eb:2c:8b:0a:0d:c1:75:80:
b7:e0
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE3F:F805:9F55:14BE:AC58:F8DB
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
d5:d9:5d:f7:64:b9:a5:06:6c:7c:d2:4e:8f:33:1e:23:4b:2f:
f1:15:04:96:1f:5f:ae:49:69:f4:5e:a6:90:04:0d:d7:2e:db:
69:c7:ca:46:69:2c:94:be:81:5b:f8:04:76:3c:7c:8f:8c:c2:
c1:6a:91:79:f9:89:6a:f7:3d:01
UA1-16376-16376 CSR
Certificate Request:
Data:
Version: 1 (0x0)
Subject: serialNumber = x1224AABBCCDDEE56789
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
88:f5:e2:d5:c7:16:1b:5b:15:a5:90:b4:a5:6c:47:
59:fe:46:cb:1b:ba:d1:1f:07:0e:b3:ec:7b:dd:28:
a9:69
Attributes:
(none)
Requested Extensions:
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
e1:18:e8:0f:78:ef:99:47:8f:ce:12:c7:f0:fa:48:eb:17:3b:
7e:b8:0d:25:46:0e:ca:ff:bb:48:54:ea:d0:8b:52:89:9c:49:
8a:4c:35:be:8f:b2:77:ff:9d:64:e4:1e:cf:23:12:5b:8b:24:
e2:0f:ac:07:33:39:b9:10:eb:00
UA1-16376-16376.pem (der is 255 bytes)
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIH8MIGvoAMCAQICAiIOMAUGAytlcDArMSkwJwYDVQQDDCAyMDAxMDAzZmZlM2Zm
ODA1OWY1NTE0YmVhYzU4ZjhkYjAeFw0yNDA5MTkwMDAxMDBaFw0yNTA5MjAyMzU5
MDBaMAAwKjAFBgMrZXADIQCI9eLVxxYbWxWlkLSlbEdZ/kbLG7rRHwcOs+x73Sip
aaMiMCAwHgYDVR0RAQH/BBQwEocQIAEAP/4/+AV4zEiMQbUrKDAFBgMrZXADQQB1
g4Yw/Rer9hISVLVUvad8dKJSe2giAaNOZbDtexeWhsZEXMWNWuhGkEefKk5IbAM9
cs9islWR1bX+o91HMXcB
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate: 400 bytes
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 8718 (0x220e)
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe3ff8059f5514beac58f8db
Validity
Not Before: Sep 19 00:01:00 2024 GMT
Not After : Sep 20 23:59:00 2025 GMT
Subject:
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
88:f5:e2:d5:c7:16:1b:5b:15:a5:90:b4:a5:6c:47:
59:fe:46:cb:1b:ba:d1:1f:07:0e:b3:ec:7b:dd:28:
a9:69
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE3F:F805:78CC:488C:41B5:2B28
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
75:83:86:30:fd:17:ab:f6:12:12:54:b5:54:bd:a7:7c:74:a2:
52:7b:68:22:01:a3:4e:65:b0:ed:7b:17:96:86:c6:44:5c:c5:
8d:5a:e8:46:90:47:9f:2a:4e:48:6c:03:3d:72:cf:62:b2:55:
91:d5:b5:fe:a3:dd:47:31:77:01
The CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates) [C509-Certificates] provides a standards-based approach to reduce the size of X.509 certificates both on-the-wire and in storage.¶
These C509 certificates MAY be stored in the DET RR, but are more likely to by used in over-the-air protocols and exist only for transmission, being converted from/to their source X.509 certificates.¶
Author's Note: This section is still a Work in Progress. The CBOR diagnostic tool is currently not working, and that content should be added back in on a later revision. Further note that we think there is a bug in the c509 code, making the certificate version = 1, not 3.¶
The following are examples of a C509 cert.¶
raa16376.cert CBOR: COSE_X509 (212 bytes) 8B 01 54 77 87 D8 A9 EB 72 E4 19 90 AF DB 94 CA 79 54 82 CB 93 D2 C5 78 20 32 30 30 31 30 30 33 66 66 65 30 30 30 30 30 35 30 36 61 62 35 38 37 35 34 66 36 38 65 36 62 33 1A 66 D3 AE BC 1A 6A 96 15 44 70 44 52 49 50 2D 52 41 41 2D 41 2D 31 36 33 37 36 0A 58 20 32 52 8C 1C 11 5D 00 4D 1F 00 8D 07 AC 50 7A 2D 83 BB AB 74 60 40 52 2E A6 CD C7 86 FA BC 80 57 86 22 82 07 50 20 01 00 3F FE 00 00 05 06 AB 58 75 4F 68 E6 B3 23 20 21 18 20 0C 58 40 EF E9 BB 74 75 FF 32 FF 72 2E CC CB B9 67 C1 6B 69 0E 99 00 84 87 1C AE E3 23 CA 69 13 C4 77 3C D3 1A C6 EA F0 40 85 F8 21 83 06 25 B0 B7 68 E2 38 82 B9 DB 1E 93 1A DB D4 6E 60 69 99 F6 E1 0F
ua1-16376-16376.cert CBOR: COSE_X509 (173 bytes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
Many people assisted in creating the python scripts for making DETs and DRIP Endorsements. Any roughness in the scripts is all my doing.¶
The openssl-user mailing list provided needed help in getting openssl command line to do what was needed to build the test PKI.¶
The COSE C509 authors are providing active help in creating the C509 equivalent objects.¶